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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
THOMAS F. KIRKHAM, Administrator of the 
Estate of William Kirkham, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DRIEN A. SPENCER and VIOLA SPENCER, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
FACTS 
CASE 
NO. 8291 
In respect to the facts there are a number of mis-state-
ments in the respondent's brief which the appellants feel 
it necessary to correct. 
First (P. 7 of respondent's brief) the trial court mere-
ly allowed Mr. Hinton to testify that he wrote a letter to 
the defendants; its contents and purpose were not admitted. 
Secondly, respondent implies ·by the second paragraph 
on P. 8 of his brief that it was the appellants' desire to allow 
the respondents to take further testimony, and that sub-
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sequently counsel ~or appellants changed his mind and ob-
jected. The actual fact is that counsel for appellant was 
unable to notify his client, because of his client's absence 
from his horne, that the court had re-opened the case and 
had set the time for hearing on the date indicated. Rather 
than inconvenience the court and respondent's counsel, sug-
gested that they proceed but had no intention of waiving 
formal objection. Objection was made properly and timely. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE (Respondent's Brief) 
The respondent suggests on P. 13 of his argument that 
he complied with the order of the court and made a thor-
ough and complete search of the premises, and yet the 
court said in its order: "and a more detailed search of the 
premises wherein deceased lived after August 21, 1953, and 
any other locations known to the heirs and representatives 
of the decedent wherein the said decedent might have made 
temporary disposition of $4800.00 paid to him prior to plain-
tiff's return frof vacation on August 22, 1953." Yet Mr. 
Hinton testified that no such search was made because he 
didn't think it was necessary, and in fact all that was of-
fered was a more detailed and better fabricated re-telling 
of the former search. In other words, the testimony of-
fered by the plaintiff was of the same search previously 
testified to; however, the re-telling was tailored to meet 
the e~pressed requirements of the court. 
POINT TWO (Respondent's Brief) 
The respondent continues to argue "Facts" that were 
never admitted as part of his case. For example, on P. 18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
of his brief, there was no evidence that demand was ever 
made for payment by the plaintiff, and yet the respondent 
desires that the Court come to a conclusion that the appel-
lants' failure to reply to this fictional or hypothetical de-
mand is evidence of the indebtedness. That unknown evi-
dence not being before the Court it is clear that there is 
no evidence to refute or contradict the receipt. 
As a matter of fact, the respondent finds himself on 
both sides of his own argument. He cites cases to show 
that the trial court's e~ressed conclusions are not evidence, 
and yet he cites them on P. 19 as such. There is no evi-
dence whatsoever that the receipt was written by different 
pencils, but I would say that if it were that would even more 
so prove its authenticity. 
POINT THREE (Respondent's Brief) 
The respondent cites the case of Holm vs. Pauly, 106 
P. 266, as authority for the proposition that the court on 
its own motion can re-open. The case is hardly in point, 
for it states none of the facts surrounding this issue, but 
merely states that the court "suggested the re-opening of 
the case" which is a great deal different than re-opening 
it on its own motion. The probable reason for such 
action is that one of the parties moved the court to re-open 
this case. Another distinguishing feature about this case 
is that it was commenced in 1902, partly tried on the 6th 
day of December, 1905, and completed on the 16th day of 
December, 1906, and the evidence introduced was not of a 
prejudicial nature, in fact, was irrelevant and immaterial. 
On Page 22 the respondent cites 88 Corpus Juris Se-
cundum 222; however, he has failed to recite the first por-
tion of the said citation, which clearly shows that this ci-
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tation is not authority for the court on its own motion to 
re-open a case, and which also shows the reason for allow-
ing such re-opening. 
"Although it has been held that when parties have 
afforded an adequate oppo.rtunity to present their res~ 
tive sides of t:..e case, ordinarily they will be compelled to 
abide by the determination to rest, whether or not a case 
shall be reopened for the introduction of evidence after both 
parties have rested their cases in chief, or after the close 
of the evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. 
The discretion however should be reasonably exerc~ so 
as not to prejudice the rights of the parties. The court 
may permit the case to be re-opened to admit evidence 
which, through inadvertence or mistake, was not introduced 
at the proper time, and ordinarily it should do so, but it is 
generally wholly within the discretion of the court whether 
it will do so." 
There was not one scintilla of evidence introduced by 
the respondent upon re-opening that could not have been 
introduced at time of trial, and there was absolutely no 
showing or even a contention raised by the respondent of 
inadvertence or mistake. If the court can re-open as it did 
in rthis case, then the appellants cannot imagine a situ-
a_tion where a re-opening would even be an abuse of dis-
cretion. 
Respondent's other citations in support of his argu-
ment are merely footnotes in Corpus Juris Secundum which 
do not even carry an editor's note. Because they are to 
foreign reports the appellants do not have the opportunity 
to refute them; however, they can hardly be taken as au-
thority. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the decision of the trial court 
shotUd be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOWARD 
SANDGREN, HOWARD & FRAZIER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
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